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INTRODUCT ORY.
It is impossible in a short thesis like the following to give
more than a bare outline of the general rules of the subject of
Negligence, a subject replete with nice distinctions and subtil-
ities and whose doctrines are only with great difficulty reduced
to any set formula. The writer has only attempted to state with
as much accuracy as possible the present doctrines under the in-
dicated subjects and to illustrate them with the later deoisions
of the courts of this state . More cases could have been cited in
nearly every instance but the writer thinks that enough have been
cited to give the reader mQre than a superficial view of the
subj e ct.
June Ist. I8,I. G. C. B.
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NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL.
Negligence has been defined by Swayne, J. (Bait. '- P.R.Co.
v. Jones 95 U.S.439--44I) as"the failure to do what a reasonable
and prudent person would have ordinarily have done under the cir-
cumstances of the situation, or doing what such a person under
the existing circumstances would not have done. The essence of
the fault may lie in omission or cornmission. The duty is dictated
and measured by the exigencies of the occasion."
The liability far negligence is limited to the natural and
prc able cansequences of the act or omission; the law regards the
the proximate and not the remo te cause Ibut the injury will not be
too remote if it ouglt to have been apprehended as a natural con-
sequence of the act even though the negligence of a third party
intervenes. The question of proximate cause is ordinarily one for 1
the jury.
The relation of the court to the jury on the question of neg-
ligence is difficult to define with any exactness. The court defirLes
the legal duty and the jury find the facts. The jury applies the
law as declared by the court to the facts and determines what the
duty was and whether ol not it was performed. But the question of
negligence is oftentimes so delicate, and the jury, especially in
actions against a corporation, so apt from the popular prejudice
against them, to find contrary to the facts, (this has been com-
mented upon judicially, Herring v. N.Y. E. Ry. 13 Barb. 9--15,
Saydam v. Grand St. & N.Ry. 41 Barb.375--380) that the court will
order a non-suit or a setting aside of the verdict when there is
no evidence of a legal duty and its breach.
Negligence is generally said to be a mixed question of law
and fact. Questions of conflicting evidence are for the jury, and
they also decide under instructions from the court as to the care
or negligence of each party.
The doctrine of contributory negligence is that a person
cannot recover for an iijury to which he has contributed by his
want of ordinary care, the care which a prudent man would excer-
cise. The -akin, of risks is not necessarily negligence, nor is
it negligence for one person to expose hinself to danger in or-
der to save the life of another who is in peril from the negligence
of the company. A direction or invitation of the servants of the
company may in certain cases relieve the plaintiff fron the cIar-
of contributory negligence, but this rule does not apply to a mere
permission. The fact that a person is a wrong doer does not give
the servantis of the c anpany any license to do him harm; this rule s
generally applied to the cases of persons run over while wrong-
fully on the property of the cwmpany. In cases of injury to chil-
dren, the degree of care required from the child is measured by
3his years and descretion, and what would be negligence in an
auult would not be so considered in the case of a young child,
and it is to be noted in this connection that Lirections by tI-
servants of the company to young persons and children may have the
effect of force.
INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES RESULTING FOi THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
CORPORATION IN FAILING TO FURNISH SAFE APPLIANCES AND PLACES IiI
VMIC-i TO WORK.
It is tile duaty of the corporation to furnish its employees
with safe appliances and places in wihich to work and in case of
their failure in this respect they are liable for injuries aris-
ing tlierefrom. The rule is not &pplied vith great strictness- for
reasonable care in this '3spect is all that is exacted and .frre
defects occur in iriplements furnishedknowledge of uhle Llefeet must
be brought home to the employer or proof that he omiLted proper
care to discover it. Dvliri v. Smith (1882) 2 ,° NI.Y. 470. The mas-
ter is not an insurer and whil3 ne must provide safe maachinery
he ctoes not guarrantee Liat it will never'fail. Dudley v. N.Y.L.E.
W. 20 Week. Dig. 118. aff. t N.1. 606. And a master is not
bound to provide against possible neglect or inattention and is
not bound to provide thae best and safest means knownm and may use
his owrm judgment provided the means are reasonable safe. Stringham
v. Hilton (1888) III 1N.Y. 18.
But ignorance by tlie master cannot be set up as a defense
when by peoper c are the master cold have discovered and rem-
edied the defect. Hillis v. Hine (1887) II St. Fep. -'.o. and
it matters not by whom Tire defective implement was constructed so
long as it was furnished by the masters direction. Ryan v. liller
12 Daly 77.
5Concurrent negligence of tie employer an. a co-servant does
not exonerate the employer, as where in a collision caused by the
negligence of an eployee two cars telescoped and by reason of
defective buffers injured a co-servant, Ellis v. N.Y.L.E.P W.
(1884) 95 N.Y. 540; or where plaintiff was thrown from a car plat-
form through the negligence of a fellow servant his injuries being
Caused by being run over by the cars by reason of a defective
brake. Lilly v. 1L.Y.C.'! Ii.R.R.R. (1887) 107 N.Y. .
An employee may rely upon the assumption that the applian-
ces furnished him are safe in absence of notice to the contrary.
Kain v. Smith (1882) 89 N.Y, 375; for example that a car is in
good condition and fit for -he reception of the load placed upon
it. Bushby v. N.Y.L.E.I: W. (1887) 107 N.Y.374.
To cite other cases under the rules given; the corporation
is bound to protect its employees by providing strong and safe
buffers although they do not own the cars, DeKay v. N.Y.L.E.& W.
19 Week. Dig. 479.; It is the duty of the corporation to keep hand
brakes in gorod condition and repair, so held sustaing recovery of
brakeman injured by the breaking of a brake wheel, the court
holding that by reasonable care the defect could have been discov-
ered upon inspection, Disher v. N.Y.C.& H.R.R R. 2 St.Rep. 276.;
but the corporation is not bound to furnish engines suitable anc
adequate in power far every emergency, so held when engine could
not be stopped in time to avoid striking yard master whose foot
awas caught in the rails., Bajus v. Syr.Y Bing. P.R. 103 I.Y. 312.
The corporation must properly prepare cai-s for shipment, so held
in a case of breaking of a defective stake in a luber car by
which a brakemen was injured. Eushby v. H.Y.L.E.- VI. 107 N.Y. 374
affirming 37 Hun 104.
INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES ,FESULTIMG FROM NEGLIGENCE OF CO-SERVANT.
The master is bound to firnish competent co-servants 13
assist and direct his eiployees, ( enployment of engineer who
cannot read a misdemeanor, # 418 Penal Code. "Any railroad corp-
oration may employ any inhabitant of the state, of the age of
twenty one years, not addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors
as a car driver or conductor, or in any other capacity, if fit
and canpetent therefory'# 42 R.R.L.) an d having performed this
ciuty the employer is not liable fcr injuries to its employees
resulting, from the negligence of a co-servant, unless as has been
shown previously (p. 5 ) the employer was guilty of concurrent
negligence.
A distinction is made in law between a vice-principal and
an employee, the master being liable for injuries caused by the
negligence of the former, but the test to determine whether one
acts as an employee or as a vice-principal is not uniform in the
different states and in this state has underg-one modifications;
the true rule nowsin this state that an employee, while eilployed
in the rerformance of employers uduties is a vice-principal with-
out regard to grade or rank or common object of service with a
co-employee. Filke v. N.Y.C.& H.R.R.R. 53 N.Y. 549 p.553. Prof.
Pratt also cites in support of this proposition in his sheets on
Negligence, McCosker v. R.R.Co. 84 N.Y.77; Slater v. Jewett, 83
N.Y. 61; hussey v. Coger, 112 N.Y. 614; Byrnes v. RR.Co. 113 N.Y.
251
Filbert v. D.' H.C.Co. 13 N.E.II04, showing to what extent the
rule has been followed. It is wetl to note that under this rale
foremen of gangs of workmen, section bosses and bosses of wrecking
trains are classed as co-employees. Beilfus v. 1.Y.L.E.'r W.
20 Hun, 556; Hansen v. Trustees N.Y.& Brook. Bridge, 27 Week.
Dig. 186; Neubaur v. N.Y.L.E.& W. , 101 N.Y. 607.
Servants of different roads are not co-servants althouh
both companies use the same tracks and yards. Sullivan v. Tioga
P.R. 112 N.Y. 646; Murphy v. N.Y.C.' c H.R.R.R. 44 hun 242; nor is
a car repairer of a railroad a co-servant with a car cleaner in
the employ of a car company with which the railroad has contract-
ed for the use of its cars. Harold v. N.Y.C.! H.R.R.R. 13 Daly 89.
We now come to the question, who are co-servants? It is safe
to say that nearly all of the emloyees of a railroad corporation
with the exception of the governing heads of departmaits who may
be classed as vice-principals, and those who are engaged in mere
clerical work ccroe under this carn.on head. For example the fol-
lowing have been decided to be co-employees; one employed to
signal trains to stop on account of blasts, and an engineer,Kenne-
dy v. M.anhattan Ry. 33 Hun 457; construction train hand and sec-
tion hand, Carr v. No. Riv. Cons. Co. 48 Hun 266; track repairer
and switchman although acting under orders from different men
9
Slatterly v. NJ.Y.L.E.& VI. 4 N.Y.Supp. £_IO; car cleaner and train-
man,; track repairer and those in charge of train on which he
rode, Russel v. Huc. Riv. R.R. I N.Y. Ic,4; brakeman of one train
and the engineer of another,VJ ighlt v. N.Y.Cent. 25 N.Y. 0i2.
This line of cases could be multirlied almost indefinatel and
made to embrace almost all employees of railroads but for a long-
er list the reader is refer ed to I Thomp. Neg. 1038.
Respondeat Superior.
The doctrine that the master is liable for the acts of his
servant when engaged in the masters service and acting under his
orders is of deservedly ancient origin, being fouded upon the
sand rrinciples of comon sense and patent to the most unlearned.
The doctrine that the master is liable for intentional and willful
injury dcne in the course of business by the servant is not so
old but deserving of eqaal respect. In the year 1800 it was decid
ed in the case of McManus v. Crickett that the master was not
liable for willful injury done by the servant in the course of his
masters business; this case was one of a driver who after dis-
charging his mast er willfully ran into and injured another vehicle
and the reasoning in the case w based upon Rolle' s Abridg-
ment was that by the act of using his master's carriage as a means
of injury the servant acquired a special propertr in it.
Thompson in his discussion of this case terms the reasoning "fan-
tastical" which seems singularly appropriate, and proceeds to show
its absurdity by the example of a brakeman ejectin- a passenger
from a car; if the ejection be proper, then of course the master
is not liable for the action of his servant was proper, and if on
the o-6her hand the ejection was improper then the brakeman acquir-
ed a special property in the car and the master had nothing to do
With the case.
This eightheth century doctrine has given place almost
universally to the opposite theory as uiie following recent
decisions will show. It was decided in QLtinn v. Power (1882) 7
1,.Y. 535 that the master is liable for the neglirence or mis-
feasance of his servant while the latter is acting within the
scope of his employment and in his master's business although
the act is contrary to the master's escietion and a viol-tion of
duty; in Haylinger v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R.R. (1882) IJ Wleek. Dig. 392
(affirmed :2 N.Y.) the court decided that when a car porter
acting in the general line of his duty, removes a trespasser
while the train is in motion, the corporaLion is liable even
though the porter acted from violence of temper. This line of cases
migilt be extended almost indefinataly. Thus the corporation is
liable for the act of its brakeman in kicking a boy off the car
steps while the train was in motion, ( Hoff man v. N.Y.C.,, H.R.R.
-7 N.Y. ) for conductor pushing plaintiff off car over during 3
squabble over payment of fare although the act was " flagrant,
reckless and illegal" (Flynn v. Central Park &c R.R. (1886) Liq
,:-.'h1. he most extreme case under this rule seems to be
1,'cKernan v. Manhattan By. Co. (187) -'4 Hun 436 where a ticket
seller on an elevated railroad came out of his ticket box and
threw a passenger down stairs and the act was decided to be within
the line of his business.
The above cases show plainly how far the old rule of 11cManas
v. Crickett has been changed and .o what extent the courts have
gone in -he new Uirection.
In tile case of injuries done by a servants of a contractor
enployed to perform a specified piece of work for the corporation
the rule stated before Uoes not appTly but is roversedand the con-
tractor is held liable ard not the corroration. This doctrine
hardly needs explanation )Lt for it is reauily seen that the
servants of the contractor are not servants of' the corporation
and consequently are not subject to its controlthe corporation
has no descretion in their selection and between the parties
there is no privity of contract.
The test to determine whether one who reiiders service to
another oes so as a contractor or not is to ascertain vether
he rendersithe service in the course of an independent occ:upation
representing the will of his employer only as to the resu.lt of his
'work and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. hexamner
v. Webb 101 N.Y. 377.
CASES ILLUSTRATING TI LIABILITY OF RAILROADS FOR INJURIES TO
PASSENGERS.
In considering the question of the liability of railroads
for negligence resulting in injuries to passengers it is to be
remembered that reasonable care, prudence and dilligence are re-
quired but that the capany is not considered in the light of an
insurer of the lives of its passengers or of their safety, (Palmer
v. Pa. Co. III N.Y.488)and that the care required of the company
in the transportation of passengers does not apply in its strict-
ness to the safety of the platforms, approaches and stairways of
the stations , ordinary care in this respect being all that is
required. Kelly v. Manhat. Ry. I12 N.Y.443. However a passenger
has the right to presume that while on the platform of a station
he is not exposed to unnecessary danger. Dobiecki v. Sharp 88 N.Y.
203.
The general rules governing this subject having been given
in other connections, decisions in particular cases will be next
cons idered.
Mail agents are entitled to the same protection as passen-
gers. Seybolt v. Lake Erie &c R.R. 95 N.Y.562, affirming 31 Hun
100.
A passenger may recover for injuries resulting from the
falling of a portion of a berth in a sleeping car, DeIongv.D.L.,c' W.
14
37 Hun 282, but not for injuries resultirg from the falling of an
article placed in the rack above him by another passenger, M1orris
v. N.Y.C.& H.R.R.E. I06 E.Y.78.
The canpany is not bound to remove snow and ice from the car
platform or to sprinkle ashes thereon when the train is running at
night through a continuous storm. Palmer v. Pa.Co. III N.Y.488.
Running a train through or into a station or between two
passenger t rains at a high rate of speed at a time when there
are passengers alighting from trains or crossing the tracks is
negligence, (Wandell v. Corbin 38 Hun 391,) and it is a question
for the jury whether a passenger who crosses the tracks under
such condition4,\ is guilty of negligence. Hirsch v. N.Y.C.? H.
R.R.R. 6 N.Y.Supp. 162. The running of trains as above is negli-
gence even though the engineer was disabled at the time by being
struck by the lever which slipped from its place after having beet
turned. Parsons v. N.Y.C.! H.R R.R. 113 N.Y.355.
The caripany must take precautions to prevent injuries to
passengers by the carelessness of persons permitted upon its
premises other than its servantsas for example where passenger
is struck by a rnail bag throvm off by a post office employee
when it is shown that the ccmpany haiconstructive knowledge of ;%t
this manner of Lischarging the mails and the agents actual kowl-
edge, no precautions beingto warn passengers or to protect them.
Carpenter v. B.'7 A.R.R. 97 N.Y.494.
'5 1I
There is no question for tie Jury when a passenger is eject-
ed for refusal to pay his fare,Johnson v.N.Y.O.,: W.R.R. 14 Week.
Dig. 495,1but a passenger in possession of his ticket cannot be
ejected because he passed through the wrong Tate to board the
train. Huerstel v. N.Y.& H.R.R. I City Ct. 134. Evidence being
;,iven that a passenger was ejected within five rods from a cross-
ing and within thirty rods from a dwelling it is for the jury to
say whether the dwelling was "near" within Sec.63j of Gen. R.R.Act.
LoQnis v. Jewett 65 Hun 313.
The purchase of a ticket gives a passenger no right to take
any particular train. A passenger must present himself in time to
take his train and has no right to delay it, so st-rting the train
on timeis not negligence even though there are passengers wishing
to take it. Paulitsch v. N.Y.C.? H.R.R.R, 102 N.Y.280.
Boarding or leaving train while in motion isgenerally and
presumedly nec-ligence per se. Salomon v. Manhat.Ry. 437. It seems
that a person boarding a train moving at the rate of from four
to six miles an hour is guilty of negligence even if he is invit-
ed to do so by i-le ccnductorcunter v. C.'- S.V.R.R. 112 1T.Y.371.
But if Th3 motion of the train was so slight that the passenger
could probably have taken it iith as much safety as if it were
standing still the fact that the train was in motion does not
make the act negligent. Lrooks v. N.Y.L.E.-Z W. 21 Week. Dig. 464.
It is negligence for the servants of a railroad to slack up
a train instead of stopping it to allow a passenger to alight
and it is culpable negligence for an officer of the company to in-
di4ce a passenger to alight while tlI, train is in rvotion, -uclitr
v. V.Y.C. ,.K.E.h. £ _ I.Y.I_&, and an assurane by tL2. brakeman
that it is safe for passenger to alight from a moving train ex-
cuses the passenger's negligence in so doing. Abbey v. N.Y.C. H.
R.R.R. 20 Week.Dig.37.
The servants of the canpany must give a passenger a reason-
able time in which to alight with his packages and when the train
is started before he has such reasonp.ble opportunity resulting in
his personal injury iT is negligenceSimpson v.R...4c.R.R.i\48.Hun
II3 " , so the starting of the train while plaintiff is alighting
therefrom held sufficient to go to the jury on the question of
defendant's negligence, Bucher v. N.Y.C.& H.R.R.R. ante.A sudden
jerk of the train after it has stopped, or nearly stopped, by
which a passenger is injured is negligence. Glidden v. N.Y.C.& H.
R.R.R. 20 Week. Dig. 313; Bartholemew v. N.Y.C.?- H.R.R.R. 102 N.Y.
affirming 20 Week. Dig. I-s.
Whether a passenger riding in the baggage car with the knowl-
edge of the conductor when no rules were posted prohibiting it as
required by Sec. 46 Gen. R.R.Act, and the danger from the injury
actually sustained was no greater than in ny other portion of
the train , is guilty of contributory negligence is a question
17
for the jury. Webster v. R.W. c. R.R. 40 Hun 161.
When no seat is furnished a passenger and he remains with
others on the platforn of the car without objection and is
thrown ofT by a sucden lurch of the train the facts do not as a
matter of law establish contributory negligence. Werle v. Long
Island R.R. 98 N.Y. 650.
FINIS.

